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Abstract
In this paper we review the conventional analyses of management control systems,
to conclude, first, that the “illusion of control” can mislead managers into believing that
everything can be controlled and monitored, and, second, that no incentive system based
only on extrinsic rewards can motivate individuals properly. Then, we investigate the
philosophical foundations of the basic assumptions that, implicitly or explicitly, are made
about the nature of the acting person. Based on personalist phenomenology, we show how the
development of technical and moral values is crucial to the long-run survival of
organizations. We end by offering some guidelines as to what control systems should be like
in order to be compatible with the nature of human persons.
Keywords: business ethics, ethical foundations of organization, incentives, management
control systems, values.THE ETHICS OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
The financial scandals of recent years have shocked society in general and the
business community in particular. In the words of Osterloh and Frey (2003), there has been
“double trouble with managerial behavior: exorbitant salaries and scandalous fraud.” To
some extent, it may even seem paradoxical that while executive salaries have been higher
than ever, at the same time the cases of fraud have been even bigger and more scandalous. 
The foreseeable conventional reactions to these phenomena include the demand for
closer monitoring, stricter accounting and auditing rules, improvements in the professional
competence of Board members, greater independence of Board members, heavier penalties
for people caught in such wrongdoing, and so on.
Such measures may be partly necessary, but they are oversimplified solutions to
what is a far more complex problem. We will argue, therefore, that while these conditions
may be necessary, they are not sufficient. What actually is needed is a change in the way we
think of human beings as members of organizations, in organizations’ reward systems, in the
motives that individuals have to participate, in the way organizations are managed from
above, and in management values. An appropriate compensation system (not necessarily
involving exorbitant salaries), a notion of purpose and mission, and the identification of the
workforce with the organization’s objectives are also vital, and may be sufficient to guarantee
appropriate behavior.
The paper is conceptually divided in two parts. In the first part, we review the
conventional analyses of management control systems, and the role of management in
organizations, based on the assumptions of the economics of organizations. We will show
how the “illusion of control” can mislead managers into believing that everything can be
controlled and monitored, while in fact no incentive system based solely on extrinsic rewards
can motivate individuals properly. In the second part, we will start by considering the nature
of the acting person, and will attempt to investigate the philosophical foundations of the basic
assumptions that, implicitly or explicitly, are made about the nature of human beings in the
context of organizations. Borrowing from personalist phenomenology, we will show how
the development of technical and moral values is crucial to the long-run survival of
organizations. In the concluding section of the paper, we will offer some guidelines as to how
control systems should be designed and used in order to be compatible with the nature of
human beings.
Can Anything be Done? Simplistic Solutions and Insufficient Conditions
Most people’s reaction to the scandals has been one of mistrust in the institutions
and procedures established to protect companies’ assets. In a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll
in the US in 2002 it was found that only one in five people had much confidence in bigbusiness, while four out of five said they had great confidence in the military. Big business
and Wall Street ranked just above health maintenance organizations when people were asked
how they viewed leading US institutions.
The reaction to the problems has often been based on a simplistic understanding of
the process by which all this wrongdoing takes place. According to this view, if we would
just assign the right people to oversee what is going on in corporations, if they had the right
training and knowledge, if they were independent, if they were given the right information,
and if there were severe punishments for any type of wrongdoing, then the problem would be
resolved: more technical competence, more monitoring, more information, more
independence, and more penalties should do the job.
Yet, those conditions may be difficult to fulfill. To begin with, people sitting on a
Board of Directors may suspect that the company is engaged in wrongdoing without having
any means of knowing for sure. If a distinguished accounting professor could be misled by
the fraudulent accounts of Enron, how is a non-technically trained person going to be able to
detect whether a given company’s accounts are “right”? Second, such a vast amount of
financial information may be required to discover signs of wrongdoing that it may be
impossible for any one individual to master it all: in an incredibly complex network of related
companies and special purpose entities, even a person who has the greatest expertise and
familiarity with that type of information can easily be overloaded by it. Third, if external
auditors are no guarantee of accurate financial statements, where can such a guarantee come
from? Can the Board of Directors do anything to ensure ethical behavior within the firm? Is it
even possible for a company to be “properly governed” by the Board, without running the
risk of resources being used improperly?
With respect to independence, how can the demand for Board members’
independence be reconciled with the need for them to have an in-depth knowledge of the firm
and its environment? Obviously, the more they get involved in the firm’s operations (which is
the only way they can obtain that in-depth knowledge), the less independent they will be, and
vice versa.
Briefly, all the conditions that it is assumed would prevent fraud may be impossible
to meet to any reasonable extent, and so any solution along those lines may simply be
unfeasible.
Two Levels of Control and their Limitations
Precisely for that reason, it is important to distinguish between two different levels
of control that necessarily exist in any corporation. First, there is the control of the behavior
of the firm and the people in charge (essentially, the Board of Directors) by society as a
whole (or by the different instances of government in its name). Second, there is the control
by the Board of Directors of what the top executives do on behalf of the firm, the control by
those top executives of middle management, and so on down through the organization.
These two types of control are qualitatively different. The first takes place through
market mechanisms, while the second takes place properly through the management control
function. In their classical paper on organization, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) provided the
economic foundations for that view. They considered a firm as a situation of team production,
where one member of the team has to specialize in monitoring the rest. That is necessary
2because it is impossible to objectively measure the contribution of each member of the team
separately: if that could be done, there would be no need for a firm, and so the market would
take care of all the arrangements optimally. As a consequence, the crucial question appears:
who will monitor the monitor? Alchian and Demsetz’s answer, widely accepted in the
Economics literature, is that the market takes care of that. A monitor who has the residual
decision rights and receives the residual returns will always make the most appropriate
decisions for the corporation as a whole, with the intention of making those residual returns
as big as possible.
Unfortunately, the market seems to be less than omniscient in timely monitoring of
what firms are doing. Often, as we have seen in the recent wave of scandals, the market
detects that something has gone wrong in the firm only when it is too late. If, in fact, the
decisions made within the firm (whether by the Board of Directors or by professional
managers is now irrelevant for our argument) show obvious, positive short-run effects (again,
whether those effects are real or fake does not matter for our argument), the market may
value them positively, no matter how bad the consequences are for the long run.
“The market” is an impersonal entity that can only act through impersonal, formal
mechanisms: information and trading that result in stock prices. Therefore, from the point of
view of the control of Boards of Directors by the market, only one line of action is
conceivable, namely to improve the process along the lines suggested above: better
information, better trained Board members, stiffer penalties for wrongdoing, and so forth.
Note, however, that the results of such actions will not necessarily be as expected,
because this is a complex process. Osterloh and Frey (2003) cite ample evidence that
independence, professional competence, etc. did not prevent some of the more extreme cases
of malpractice we have seen in recent years. More competence, greater independence and
stricter financial controls will not necessarily result in better outcomes.
The second level of control takes place in a personal way, through the interaction of
a controllor and a controllee. This offers better opportunities for improvement and avoidance
of wrongdoing, but is often overlooked as a somewhat technical matter, even though it has
limitations similar to those of the market as a control mechanism. We will analyze that next
in more detail.
Management Control Systems and Goal Congruence
The role of management control systems has always been considered to be that of
changing the behavior of the individuals working in an organization by attempting to align
the interests of the individuals with the interests of the organization. One essential element of
the management control process is a formal system of: 1) goal-setting; 2) performance
measurement and evaluation; and 3) incentives. 
There seems to be broad agreement that the basic criterion for evaluating a
management control system is that of “goal congruence.” In a classic textbook formulation:
“In a goal congruent process, the actions people are led to take in accordance with their
perceived self-interest are also in the best interest of the organization” (Anthony and
Govindarajan, 2003, p. 93).
3Ideally, then, in the context of formal control systems, incentives should be aligned
with the best interest of the organization through the evaluation process, and a compensation
formula that is a function of the result of that evaluation. The process is usually less than
perfect, however, because the organizational goal is difficult to measure, possibly somewhat
ambiguous, or even fuzzy. The degree of ambiguity, or fuzziness, will vary, depending on the
type of organizational unit or job. In simple, mechanical jobs, the goal to be achieved can be
defined very clearly and is rather simple to measure. But as soon as we move on to more
complex situations, measurement systems are very imperfect or even difficult to define, and
the result of the measurement is inevitably different from the goal the organization is actually
trying to achieve. Furthermore, the goal to be achieved is often defined only imperfectly, and
frequently is intended to be modified or updated as the organization progresses towards it,
gaining knowledge of the whole process and the changing circumstances as it goes along.
In contrast, any performance measurement system intended to provide the formal
basis for an incentive must necessarily be very specific; therefore, the correlation between the
real goal to be pursued and the performance actually measured is bound to be less than one.
Broadly speaking, it is clear that the simpler the situation, the higher the correlation between
measured performance and the real goal is likely to be; and (of course) the more complex the
situation (or the organizational goal), the weaker the correlation. Since structured, mechanical
jobs take place at relatively low levels in the organization, it follows that at the higher (e.g.,
managerial) levels of the organization, where everything is rather complex, the correlation
between the real goal and the measured variable is bound to be much lower than one.
Thus, the fundamental management control problem can be expressed as follows.
Any action that the controllee can take will (as a rule) influence the organization’s real goal
and the measured performance differently; therefore, the controllee will on occasion have to
choose between an action that will bring the organization closer to its real goal but will result
in a low value of measured performance, and an action that improves the performance
measure but does not bring the organization any closer to its real goal. The manager’s choice,
of course, will depend on the incentive system:
– Suppose there is no incentive payment associated with measured performance (i.e.,
managers are not rewarded differently depending on the action they choose). Then,
managers will choose the action on the basis of: 1) what they think is the best course
of action for the organization as a whole, and(2) the utility or disutility of each
action to themselves (e.g., the effort required to take certain actions, or the
enjoyment in others), which will be only coincidentally related to the action’s
organizational usefulness. The relative importance of 1) and 2) will depend on
the specific situation: of course, perfectly selfish managers will neglect the
organizational goals, while managers who identify with such goals will do
the opposite.
– Suppose there is a monetary incentive on the measured variable. Then, the controllee
will be more inclined to do whatever improves the performance measure, but not
what is best for the organization, which is only imperfectly correlated with the
performance measure. If the incentive is strong enough (as it often has been in recent
times, in the form of stock options, for instance), it should not be surprising that the
manager will do anything in her power (including fraud) to improve the performance
measure.
The analysis above is based on Baker (1992), as reformulated in Gibbons (1998),
where the author provides an excellent summary of the findings of the theoretical literature
4that has studied this problem in depth. The basic conclusion of Baker’s analysis is that to
induce an agent to choose first-best actions, a contract must create incentives that match the
marginal social benefits; but that is impossible in general.
The Gibbons summary includes two further conclusions on formal control systems.
First, that relative performance evaluation systems (in the language of formal models,
tournaments), which have become relatively common in the last few years, have some
serious drawbacks: a big incentive to win the tournament may induce sabotage of other
managers’ results instead of efforts to do better oneself (Lazear, 1989). Second, that (i) if an
action has an effect on the performance measure but none at all on the organizational goal,
and is therefore organizationally useless, the incentive may induce the agent to perform that
useless action. Of course, the converse is also true: (ii) if an action has a decisive effect on
the organizational goal, but none on the performance measure, the incentive may induce the
agent not to perform that action.
Thus, it will be pure coincidence if the interest of the manager (with or without the
explicit incentive) happens to coincide with the organizational goal. Therefore, perfect goal
congruence cannot exist in practice in any complex situation. Again, according to Anthony
and Govindarajan (2003, page 94), we may have to settle for less: “an adequate control
system will at least not encourage individuals to act against the best interests of the
organization.” 
Is the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B Inevitable?
But even that may be too ambitious an objective. In light of our analysis, we might
ask, somewhat rhetorically, whether the classical problem analyzed by Kerr (1975) about the
folly of rewarding A while hoping for B is avoidable at all. In the 1995 issue of the Academy
of Management Executive (Vol. 9, No. 1), Executive Advisory Panel members were asked
about the subject, and “...ninety per cent of our respondents told us that Kerr’s folly is still
prevalent in corporate America today. Over half concluded that “the folly is widespread in
their companies” (page 15). Obviously, after twenty years, if the solution were easy, it would
have been applied already, and the folly would have disappeared. Our analysis provides not
only an explanation for the survival of the folly, but also a justification for saying that the
answer to our question can only be a categorical no: the folly is not 100% avoidable as a
result of any formal system alone. On the one hand, with no explicit incentive systems, firms
run into the problems that Kerr explained so vividly: the examples in his article have implicit,
unintended incentives rather than a purposefully designed incentive system. On the other, we
have just seen that an explicit incentive system that always provides an incentive in the
“right” direction (the organizational goal) cannot exist except perhaps in trivial or very well
structured situations: the ambiguity or fuzziness of the firm’s short-run objectives, explained
above, makes it necessary to base the incentives on a different, measurable variable that is
only imperfectly correlated with the desired organizational objective.
In general, therefore, individuals in organizations will have to make decisions
balancing the organizational goals as communicated to them and perceived by them, against
their own self-interest (again, as they perceive it), and (possibly) including the explicit
incentive system which is supposed to foster those organizational goals. Depending on the
circumstances, this balance may go in the right or the wrong direction for the organization.
5The Illusion of Control
This is closely related with what in the accounting literature has been called “the
illusion of control.” According to Dermer and Lucas (1986),
“...the illusion (of control) fosters the belief among managers that
conventional controls such as operating standards, profit targets and budgetary
criteria accurately and validly measure, and thereby help determine, behavior. The
illusion reflects a presumption that management can intervene when necessary and
successfully effect change. Further, the illusion provides for the belief that, by
changing a given mix of existing controls, managers make necessary and sufficient
functional responses to internal or external change. To those managing with an
illusion of control, negative consequences of managerial action often signify the
necessity for more controls” (page 471).
The issue goes back at least as far as Merton, in 1940. According to March and
Simon (1958):
“Merton (1940) is concerned with dysfunctional organizational learning:
organization members generalize a response from situations where the response is
appropriate to similar situations where it results in consequences unanticipated and
undesired by the organization …/… Merton’s system of propositions begins with a
demand for control made on the organization by the top hierarchy. This demand
takes the form of an increased emphasis on the reliability of behavior within the
organization....” (page 57).
Three consequences follow: 1) “there is a reduction in the amount of personalized
relationships …/… the official reacts to other members of the organization not as more
or less unique individuals but as representatives of positions that have specified rights or
duties;” 2) “rules originally devised to achieve organizational goals assume a positive value
that is independent of the organizational goals;” and 3) “there is an increased use of
categorization as a decision-making technique …/… an increase in the use of categorization
for decision-making decreases the amount of search for alternatives” (March and Simon,
1958, page 58). These three consequences increase the rigidity of responses, with the result
that reliability of behavior is greater and the defensibility of individual actions is greater, too;
but difficulties with clients increase as well. If, therefore, the response of the organization is
more control and emphasis on the reliability of behavior, things can only get worse.
Along similar lines, Hofstede (1981) shows that there are four reasons why a
cybernetical, mechanistic model of control may not be appropriate: a) the objectives are
ambiguous; b) the measures of the outputs are by nature very imperfect; c) there is also
imperfect knowledge of cause-effect relationships between management interventions and
results; and d) some activities are not repetitive.
His analysis is focused on non-profit activities, but can easily be extended to any
kind of organization, including, of course, business firms. Indeed, with respect to the first
point, even if we accept that the objectives of business firms are primarily the long-run
profitability of the firm, the short-run objectives (which are the only ones that can be used
operationally) are rather ambiguous. Is customer satisfaction in the short run more important
than training the company’s personnel to maintain and develop the firm’s distinctive
competence? How do they relate to the search for new markets for the company’s products?
The list of possible questions obviously does not end here, as any conventional application of
management by objectives would clearly show.
6The second point –imperfect measurability of the outputs– is well-known, both in
theory and in practice, and is a crucial one to our purposes. In spite of the current trend
toward increasing the number of measurements and the attempt to make them more precise,
reflected for instance in the use of “balanced scorecards,” it should be only too clear that
most of the measurements are very imperfect. In fact, accounting measures are possibly the
most precise of all, and yet their shortcomings have unfortunately become only too obvious
in the last few years.
The third point –imperfect knowledge of the cause-and-effect relationships–
typically leads human beings to use theories of control different from the ones they espouse.
Argyris (1990) argues that “most human beings activate a human theory of control to deal
with embarrassment or threat. The dilemma is that this human theory of control is
counterproductive to objectivity, rigor, tough testing of conclusions, that is, to productive
reasoning (…); espoused theories are usually idealized versions that are rarely achieved.
They represent an aspiration to be approximated,” while “practitioners often react by defining
defensive routines to protect their practice.” Among others, distortion of accounting
information in at least six methods: smoothing, biasing, focusing, gaming, filtering and
“illegal acts” (Birnberg et al., 1983). Defensive routines can be considered spontaneous
reactions based on a simplistic model of behavior.
The demand for more control, more monitoring and stricter procedures goes typically
along the lines of such defensive routines; and the answer of the other party goes along the six
methods cited in the last paragraph. This happens in a particularly intense way today, where
the illusion of control may take a technological form, with the huge quantities of information
that IT makes available: it would seem as if a very detailed information system (or a well-
thought-out balanced scorecard) could comprehend everything there is in an organization.
According to our analysis, that is clearly false.
Formal systems of management control thus have severe shortcomings, but are
necessary in spite of them. The total absence of formal systems of performance evaluation,
perhaps associated with reward systems, may be extremely dangerous. Performance indices
have to be seen as a check on the expected results, which cannot be “really” measured. But
provided that there is a reasonable correlation between the “real” variable and the measured
performance, a quantifiable variable is a help to any decision-maker to check whether the
intangible results the firm wishes to obtain appear somehow in tangible form. But let us insist
that, to avoid the illusion of control, performance indices have to be interpreted and used
properly, as tools of diagnosis rather than as an expression of the actual achievement of
organizational objectives. This has been visualized by Simons (1993), who calls the most
classical feed-back control systems, which rely heavily on financial variables, “diagnostic
control systems.” This expression conveys very well the idea that diagnosis should be the
main purpose of such systems. When, in practice, they are seen as expressions of real
achievements, management may be said to be leading the organization towards the wrong
goals.
Selfish interests and organizational identification
It follows, then, that in general it is impossible to have a system of evaluation and
incentives, a set of standard procedures, budgetary targets, close monitoring, or any other
formal system that can always guarantee that the results of actions by individuals will be
ethical or in the best interest of the organization. Formal systems are not only incapable
7of doing the fine tuning needed for that purpose, but often they can be at the origin of
unethical behavior on the part of executives.
The fact that incentive systems are always less than perfect, and therefore can never
be relied upon to induce proper behavior on the part of individuals, is admittedly widely
recognized, at least in theory. The search for a “perfect” system is, according to Brickley,
Smith and Zimmerman (2003), a “Nirvana fallacy,” whereby a system is “discarded or
revamped if it allows any minor managerial opportunism, no matter how minor, in favor of
the unachievable perfect system” (page 42).
This seems to be common sense. Seldom (if ever) in management are there perfect
alternatives; so we should not expect to find one in control systems. Obviously, we have to
settle for one that is less than perfect; and an imperfect system will necessarily allow (at
least) some “minor” managerial opportunism. Consistent with this view, Brickley, Smith and
Zimmerman (2003) argue that what went wrong with all the scandals was essentially that the
architecture of the system (allocation of decision rights, performance measures and
compensation structure) was flawed. A better design of the incentive system would have
eliminated the causes of such scandals.
This may be partially true, but unfortunately it may be a little bit too optimistic in
light of our analysis. As a rule, the designers of the systems of the companies that were
involved in major scandals were highly competent people who did not mean to do the “wrong
thing” from the outset; what they wanted was a powerful system of incentives that would
adequately reward outstanding efforts and promote the company’s interests. Stock options
seemed to be the ideal vehicle for that purpose, by focusing on the future value of the
company to shareholders and thus eliminating any short-term temptations. Big rewards
seemed to ensure that this would happen. But obviously, the task of evaluating beforehand
whether a reward system is going to be congruent with organizational goals is far from
simple; and the risk of a system leading to misbehavior is obviously greater, the greater the
rewards. It was partly the exorbitant amounts of these incentives, then, that made the delicate
balance between personal and organizational goals tilt toward courses of action that simply
maximized (or, in any case, made very big) the incentive payments to be received by the
executives.
However, the amounts do not have to be exorbitant to induce misbehavior if
individuals are selfish utility maximizers. If that is the case, they will take advantage of any
opportunity to obtain some gain, no matter how small. Suppose, for instance, that a manager
is personally indifferent between two alternatives in terms of intrinsic motivation (effort or
enjoyment associated with the two alternatives). The two produce different results in terms of
the degree of achievement of the assumed organizational goal, and they also produce
different results in terms of the performance measure and incentive payment: the one that is
better from the point of view of the organizational goal generates a lower performance
measure. Would there be a reason for such a manager to take the action that produces better
organizational results, at a personal loss to himself in terms of the incentive payment?
Clearly, there would not. As the manager is a selfish utility maximizer, the decision he makes
will be the one that leads to higher performance measures, and so to higher incentive
payments. This, of course, may simply be taken to mean that agency costs do exist.
Performance measurements and incentive systems are intended to correct this fact, but
sometimes they merely succeed in making things worse.
The logical consequence would be that the only thing to worry about is to ensure
that those costs are never too high, or that the management opportunism the system allows is
8only “minor.” But then a crucial question springs to mind: how “minor” is “minor?” And
also, how can we judge whether something is “minor?” Any “minor” opportunity to induce
managerial opportunism might become “major” if the amount at stake is high. Suppose, for
the sake of concreteness, that in the example in the preceding paragraph the difference in the
results for the company under the two action alternatives is big, and the difference between
the incentive payments to the decision maker in each case is rather small (or at least not so
big) and of the opposite sign: then, the agent may cause the company to incur a large
(opportunity) loss, while making a small gain for herself. Thus, the firm may be doing the
wrong thing for itself (destroying value in the long run) precisely by having such an incentive
system. The fact that the gain for the manager is small makes it “minor” for her, even though
it may be “major” for the company. Suppose now that things are the other way around, i.e.,
that the difference in results for the company is rather small, but the difference in incentive
payments is big, while still being of opposite sign. Then, the manager may go to a lot of
trouble, misallocating her time and effort, in order to secure the big incentive payment
provided by the wrong alternative, which again is bad for the company. Can this be
considered “minor” for the firm? It will depend on the value of the manager’s time and effort,
and on the payment itself.
Therefore, we are back to the idea that no system is fool-proof; and to Berle and
Means, who in their classic The Modern Corporation and Private Property, already argued in
1932 that managers have their own interests to pursue. Or, in the language of today’s agency
theory, that a person is never a perfect agent for anyone else (Jensen, 1993).
But while this last statement is clearly true, a company can try to decrease agency
costs by other means. Chester Barnard recognized many years ago that an organization did
not necessarily need “objective inducements” (incentives) to “secure the efforts necessary for
its existence;” it could also achieve the same result by “changing states of mind” (persuasion)
(1938, p.141). Persuasion and informal systems are closely related. You don’t persuade other
people of anything in the context of a formal system. The formal system can only encourage
the type of behavior it rewards. It is really the direct relationship between two people that
makes it possible for one to persuade the other that something is worthwhile.
Quite obviously, there are situations where explicit, monetary incentives do not
exist, or are not even conceivable: politicians, judges, the military and many other public
officials do their jobs on a fixed salary. There, persuasion plays a crucial role. This point was
forcefully made by Vice-Admiral Diego E. Hernández (US Navy, retired), when in the
context of a Harvard Business Review Case Study he was asked to give his opinion on
the situation presented by the case (Kerr, 2003, p. 10). He recommended “to look beyond pay
for performance and make more effective use of intangible rewards. Public recognition, a
letter of appreciation, or a word of praise can do a great deal to focus an individual’s attention
on organizational targets.” He adds: “Leaders in the US armed services have no control over
compensation levels (…) We’re intensely focused on mission achievement and realize that’s
entirely dependent on everybody buying in and giving it everything they’ve got (…); we
listen to people’s concerns and make use of multiple feedback loops so we can hear the truth.
We create interim goals and publicly recognize interim successes (…) We differentiate with
an aim to promoting the top performers and getting rid of underperformers (…) In the end,
people identify strongly with the goals of the organization and feel energized when they
achieve those goals.”
Precisely in this context, organizational identification and loyalty are crucial
concepts. The concept of identification goes back at least to Herbert Simon’s Administrative
Behavior, where he defined the concept by stating that “a person identifies himself with a
9group when, in making a decision, he evaluates several alternatives of choice in terms of the
consequences for the specified group”). Therefore, a person who is identified with different
organizations thinks in terms of “what is good for the country,” “what is good for the firm,” or
“what is good for the fire department,” rather than for himself. If members of an organization
strongly identify with it, there is no need for explicit incentives, because they will do what is
in the (perceived) best interest of the organization anyway (Simon, 1947, Chapter 11).
This is parallel to what Frey and Meier (2002) called having “pro-social” intrinsic
preferences, but goes a little bit beyond that concept. “Preferences” are typically static, and
are taken as given, while loyalty towards, and identification with, a given organization cannot
be taken as given: rather, they develop through time if certain conditions are met (Rosanas
and Velilla, 2003). Thus, identification and loyalties may become a complement to Osterloh
and Frey’s (2003) recommendation of hiring people with such pro-social preferences to avoid
misbehavior in organizations.
What becomes important, then, is the dynamics by which identification and loyalties
are created and develop. For that purpose, however, we need to go in more depth into the
basic assumptions about the acting person.
The Acting Person
Any theory about how organizations work is based in some assumptions or models
about the “nature of man.” Sometimes the assumptions are made totally explicit (e.g., Jensen
and Meckling, 1998; Simons, 1995); sometimes they are only implicit. But in any case, these
assumptions are crucial to the purpose of management control. According to Simons,
they are:
“... assumptions about how value is created, how strategies are formed, and
how people behave in organizations. In the day-to-day life of organizations, these
assumptions, which are unspoken and unchallenged, influence the ways in which
managers control strategy and the extent to which their efforts are successful. These
assumptions determine how managers deal with subordinates, how decision
authority is delegated, and what types of behavior managers expect from themselves
and from the people who work for them.” (1995, p. 171) 
Simons goes on to suggest that if managers have to choose between two models of
human behavior (along the lines of McGregor’s Theories X and Y), they can make two types
of errors. Type 1 errors occur when managers assume that the Theory X model is true, while
employees are in fact hardworking, honest and trustworthy; Type 2 errors occur when
managers assume that the Theory Y model is true, while employees are in fact lazy and
dishonest. In the first case, the error may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy: employees feel
they are not trusted, and therefore they may be unwilling to commit to and work toward
the organizational goal. Obviously, the long-run consequences to the firm are negative. In the
second case, employees may take advantage of the trust deposited in them to shirk and
misappropriate assets, at a substantial cost to the firm even in the short run.
In general, these assumptions are based on the postulates of some philosophical
school. Here, we are going to base ours in the proposals of personalist phenomenology, in the
tradition of Brentano, Scheler, von Hildebrand and, more recently, Wojtyla (1979). That
philosophy is consistent, as we will see, with a dynamic analysis that takes into account
10the learning by individuals while acting. We will base our work here in the approach of
Crosby (1996), because his formulation is very close to our purpose.
The basic postulates of personalist phenomenology that we need for our purposes
can be summarized in the following five points:
1. Human beings can achieve through action some effects that they want and that are
external to them. Action thus makes actual something that was a mere possibility
before. In turn, this possibility is at the origin of any action taken by a human being.
2. Every concrete person has some potential to be developed. The actualization of
everything that concrete persons have as potential constitutes, in itself, their end as
human beings. That actualization takes place through action, in which individuals
develop their values. Thus, action can be seen as the way for human beings to self-
actualize.
3. The tension between what human beings can become as persons, but are not yet (i.e.,
the effect of the action on themselves), is a powerful mover of those persons to
action. 
4. With the purpose of becoming more and more themselves (i.e., self-actualizing),
acting persons interact with other beings that they consider valuable to differing
degrees, depending on the nature of those beings. A crucial point in this respect is
that this valuation should be “right,” mainly with respect to the value of other human
beings. Human beings have a value in their own right, and so cannot interact with
other human beings as if they were “things” without deviating from their own end as
people. In other words, human beings harm themselves when they treat other people
as “things,” which, essentially, does not mean that they treat them “badly,” but that
they do not take into account that those other people need to self-actualize through
their own actions too.
5. The human person can perceive and develop values. The kind of values that are
given to the person as potential, and that have to do with that potential being
developed (intelligence, knowledge, operating skills, and so on), are called technical
values. Moral values are those values that make a person a better person. Since the
two kinds of values are crucial to our purpose, we will develop these concepts
further in the next section.
This view of the human being is essentially dynamic. Human persons are
responsible for their own acts and, therefore, for their own personal development. Note that
this development may be negative, i.e., human beings can deteriorate or become less self-
actualized by doing “the wrong thing” in their actions (e.g., dealing with other human beings
as if they were “things,” as said above). With their actions, they can get closer or farther from
their end, which is (in the philosophical approach adopted here) their perfection. At the same
time, through action, changes take place inside human beings, mainly with respect to the
actualization of their potentialities; and, very specially, those that have to do with the capacity
to perceive the value of their actions in accordance with moral values.
Osterloh and Frey (2003) rightly observe that “social dilemmas arise if the actions of
self-interested individuals do not lead to socially desirable outcomes,” the prisoner’s dilemma
game being a classical example of such a situation. In contrast, our analysis leads us to go
beyond those social dilemmas and see a continuous “personal dilemma” between selfishness
11and openness to others. By acting selfishly, not only can human beings harm other human
beings (which would be the reason for the social dilemma), but also they can harm
themselves by becoming more and more selfish and moving backward in their own
development as persons. In contrast, by doing the opposite (i.e., by taking other people’s
interests and needs into account when they act) human beings develop their own freedom,
which consists precisely in the degree of perception and practical utilization of moral values,
as opposed to simply following one’s own (often irrational) impulses. In turn, this
development of freedom will entail a development of rationality and the capacity to
appreciate moral values.
Technical values and moral values
As stated above, technical and moral values are crucial to our purpose, so we need
now to go into the concept in more depth. Let’s first review the definition. In Crosby’s words:
“There are many things which take on from us a certain character of goodness
as a result of satisfying us, or being agreeable to us. (...) The agreeableness of all
these things is not simply found, as if it existed independently of being experienced,
but exists only in the experiencing of those persons for whom such things are
agreeable (...) (In contrast), we find many things whose goodness is independent of
our satisfaction” (1996, page 174).
That is, for instance, true of the value of a human being to another being. The value
of the one does not depend on being experienced as “pleasant” by the other. According to the
philosophical postulates that we have adopted, human beings have a value in themselves that
does not depend on such value being experienced by others. Hildebrand referred to this
“goodness” we have just described, which is not a consequence of our satisfaction and which
presents itself as inherent to the being that possesses it, as “value”. Other authors (Wojtyla,
1979; Guardini, 1999) have used the same term consistently.
Value is thus partaking of goodness in the sense of being ourselves good or worthy.
Aristotle, and later Kant, saw that many excellent personal qualities are compatible with
moral evil. Those values of the person are known as technical values. Technical disvalue
simply consists of a privation of that value. In contrast, moral values are obviously
incompatible with moral evil: a moral disvalue is what is antithetically opposed to goodness.
People are always responsible for their moral value or disvalue, but they are not
always responsible for technical value or disvalue. An act has technical value by virtue of a
certain relation to the person who performs it. Moral value, besides this relation to the acting
person, derives from the harmony of the act with the goods to which is directed. Moral values
have a character of transcendence and participation in moral goodness.
Again, according to Crosby, 
“When a person is enriched with moral worth, he gains a qualitative fullness
in himself which, though based on a right relation to value and impossible without
such a relation, is itself much more than any such relation” (1996, p.224). 
“It is one of the most elementary moral truths that in being morally good,
human persons become good as human persons; they become good, not in some
12particular, ‘regional’ respect, not good as carpenter, as surgeon, as musician, but
good as human persons” (1996, p.231).
Management Control Systems and Persons
We  have argued above that the basic purpose of any control system is to obtain
behavior –a set of actions– on the part of individuals that is congruent with organizational
goals. Therefore, it is intended to influence a human action, and every human action has an
ethical dimension insofar as it relates to the ultimate ends of human beings. Consequently,
controlling human beings as we have described appears to be a rather complex task that has
numerous implications, as indicated in the previous section.
To begin with, in exercising this influence over the behavior and actions of people,
the control system must respect the characteristics of human action that make it personal
action. A personal action is one that originates in oneself. In Crosby’s words:
“Persons act as persons by acting through themselves, that is, acting with an
acting which is radically their own. My acting as a person is not an undergoing, or
an enduring, or a transmitting of what originates outside of myself. It is I, I myself,
who act when I act as a person and no one else” (1996, p. 26).
According to the philosophy that we have adopted in this paper, a control system
reduced to a system of explicit incentives is ethically unacceptable. It de-personalizes the
human being by denying her the opportunity of actually performing a personal action.
Besides, on the same philosophical basis, such systems ignore people’s potential to develop
their technical and moral values, by not appealing to them. 
A control system that does not appeal to technical values, i.e., the values that can
stimulate the actualization of a person’s potential, sacrifices a potential that may be useful for
developing the firm’s distinctive competence. At the same time, since values are the engine
that originates action, such a system would relinquish the intrinsic strength that perceiving
those values arouses in the human person. Therefore, even from a purely economic
perspective, this reductionism may become much more costly to the firm in terms of
foregone opportunities.
Dynamically, by not appealing to the person’s technical values, the organization will
make the chosen alternative unfit to develop those technical values and take full advantage of
the individual’s potential. Therefore, the acting person will have difficulties in attaining and
developing those values through the action proposed to her.
Of course, the acting person may react and redesign the action to develop her
technical values while, at the same time, achieving the goal that the organization desires. This
would be a reflection of the person’s professional quality. In any case, such redesign may
originate new rules and policies that would make it more difficult to do the same thing again
in the future.
This dynamic process may give rise to two different situations:
1. Not seeing herself self-actualized in technical values, the person may become
increasingly dissatisfied. To compensate, she may demand that the organization
13increase her explicit incentive, which, from an ethical point of view, means
continuing the process of de-personalization with respect to the individual’s desire to
perform a personal action.
2. The person may adapt by giving up the development of those technical values in
exchange for the extrinsic incentive. This would mean that the control system has
“succeeded:” it has de-personalized that person. But, of course, both the person and
the organization are worse-off. Dynamically, the situation is even more unfair, as
when the organization changes the desired results, the person is unlikely to be able
to adapt to the new objectives. Therefore, the person becomes “worthless” for the
organization.
When a control system does not appeal to moral values, the organization and the
person lose the development of the person as such, and forego the opportunity of having
those values act as the starting engines of the action in the future. It is this dimension that
gives sense to the action. A system that is based exclusively on extrinsic incentives does not
take into account the possibility that the action’s ultimate purpose is to satisfy other people’s
needs, and so loses the potential strength of moral values and, therefore, of identification with
the organization’s objectives. The message that such a system sends is that identification is
unwanted: what is really wanted are the specific results that the system rewards. Therefore,
the action is highly unlikely to solve real needs of other people: customers, other people in
the organization, or any external party affected by the action. And of course, the more
complex those needs, the more unlikely it is to do so.
Again, as in the case of technical values, the person can redesign the action in such a
way that she is able to develop moral values while at the same time meeting the explicit
demands of the system. But the relationship between the person and the organization will
become increasingly difficult: there is a lack of fit between the person and the organization.
If, instead, the person adapts to the system, then the ethical deterioration of the
person should be obvious: giving up moral values for extrinsic rewards is merely a first step
toward fraud and scandal. Whether fraud actually occurs or not is simply a matter of cost-
benefit analysis by the individual, taking into account, on the one hand, the profits from fraud
and, on the other, the risk of being caught and the corresponding penalty.
Conclusion: Toward Management Control Systems that are Compatible with Full
Human Development
We  started this paper by analyzing some of the technical limitations inherent to
Management Control Systems. We have moved to a higher conceptual point of view and
shown the (de-personalization) risks involved in systems that rely exclusively (or heavily) on
monetary incentives. We shall end by summarizing our findings and attempting to establish
the bases for the design of control systems that are compatible with the development of
human beings and so avoid the risks of de-personalization.
To begin with, a formal system of management control (a well-established system of
quantitative evaluation and performance indices) is necessary in any organization beyond a
certain size. The degree of sophistication and the type of incentives it includes will vary, but it is
inconceivable that any but a small organization could be run without it. First, for the purpose of
decision-making activities: this is the main application of the classical control systems, which
14(as we mentioned) Simons calls “diagnostic control systems.” They should be used primarily as
tools for diagnosis, rather than as measurement devices that constitute the basis of the incentive
system (as is often the case). Second, because it is necessary to achieve a minimum
effectiveness of the organization, so that the demands of the various stakeholders can be met.
Specific measurements that allow management to evaluate explicit results that will satisfy
different stakeholder constituencies are clearly necessary to verify that that is happening.
But, as shown in the preceding paragraphs, a management control system that is not
de-humanizing must take into account, first, the need to use and develop the technical values
of people in the organization. Technical values cannot, as a rule, be included in the formal
control system. In practice, they are taken into account by attempting to match the required
personal qualities (actual technical values) with the requirements of different jobs. The usual
systems and processes for doing this are Personnel Selection, Job Evaluation, Career
Planning, and so on.
Necessarily, all those systems have to be complemented with direct managerial
action, an informal relationship based on personal contact. This relationship must be mainly
“educational,” in the original (Latin) sense of “educere,” i.e., knowing how to use and
develop the potential technical values that individuals themselves may not even be aware
they possess.
The process of “discovering” people’s values and helping to develop their technical
potential is a substantial part of the organization’s “internal mission” (Pérez López, 1993,
Chapter 7), which essentially consists of building unity and mutual trust between the
members of the organization. Developing technical values in individuals is also the basis of
the organization’s distinctive competence, i.e., what an organization can do better than
anyone else. Therefore, it is crucial to the development of the organization’s character in the
short run, and its survival in the long run (Selznick, 1957).
But also, and in second place, the control process must appeal to moral values, as it
is crucially important that people learn about the actions that are desirable to the organization
itself as well as to its customers. Those actions are the ones that satisfy the real needs (as
opposed to perceived needs) of other people. In order to learn about them, individuals need to
develop their moral values. The real needs that the organization intends to satisfy constitute
what Pérez López calls the organization’s “external mission.” The organization’s “internal
mission” can then be alternatively seen as being to satisfy the real needs of the other
members of the organization, including as a necessary condition the development of their
technical values (1993, Chapter 7).
A control system that is compatible with the development of human persons needs
to satisfy those two conditions as necessary characteristics. Unfortunately, there is not (and
perhaps cannot be) any ready-to-use tool or technique to put them into practice. Fortunately,
though, there are some ways to make it more likely, but they go beyond a mere technique.
The management control literature contains some elements of what is needed. For
instance, in Simons’ analysis, what he calls “belief systems” are closely related to those
conditions. In fact, in Simons’ framework, one of the basic assumptions about behavior is
that individuals desire to contribute (and, therefore, in our framework, to develop their own
moral values, as well as other people’s). According to Simons, an “organizational block”
occurs when an organization is “unsure of its purpose;” and the remedy is to “communicate
core values and mission.” The “lever of control” for that purpose is the one he calls “belief
systems” (Simons, 1995, page 173).
15What is decisive for our purposes, however, is the role of management, which goes
well beyond those levers. Individuals seldom identify with abstract values: it is much easier
to “see them” through the action of top management. Informal relationships are the way to
bring to life and transmit those values, essentially through example and persuasion. We finish
with the words of Crosby: 
“It follows that the personalistic opposite of unjustified coercion is a certain
kind of persuasion. If I want to move another to act, and to move the other in such a
way as to respect his or her personhood, then I give the other reasons that can be
understood; I convey the point of the proposed action and help the other person to
see it for himself. I enable the other to go in a certain direction, not as an extension
of my own willing, but with a willing that is truly his own as mine is my own. All
authentic education has to use as much persuasion and as little coercion as possible,
and has thus to aim at the greatest possible independence of the educated from the
educator...” (1996, page 27). 
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